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This paper presents a DGE model in which aggregate price level
inertia is generated endogenously by the optimizing behaviour of price
setting ￿rms. All the usual sources of inertia are absent here ie., all
￿rms are simultaneously free to change their price once every period
and face no adjustment costs in doing so. Despite this, the model
generates persistent movements in aggregate output and in￿ ation in
response to a nominal shock. Two modi￿cations of a standard one-
quarter pre-set price model deliver these results: learning-by-doing
and habit formation in leisure.
Key words: Endogenous price stickiness, Business Cycles, In￿ a-
tion, Nominal rigidities, Learning-by-doing, Habit formation, Propa-
gation mechanisms, Persistence.
11 Introduction
There has been a recent surge in interest in dynamic general equilibrium
models in which ￿rms adjust their prices infrequently. Many of these models
employ one of two classes of time-dependent pricing rules associated with
Taylor (1999) and Calvo (1983).1 In the former, prices are set for a given
number of periods and the opportunity to adjust prices is staggered so that
not all ￿rms can adjust prices in any given period. In the latter, ￿rms face
a ￿xed probability of being able to adjust prices in each period. While the
duration for which prices are ￿xed is uncertain for an individual ￿rm, the
average duration is known and in the aggregate a constant fraction of all
￿rms will adjust prices every period as in the Taylor model.2
While these models have had some success in generating empirically plau-
sible business cycles in response to monetary shocks the pricing arrangements
embedded in the models are theoretically unappealing.3 This theoretical
weakness arises from the exogenous nature of the pricing arrangements im-
posed upon ￿rms which determine both the length of time for which prices
cannot be re-optimized as well as the degree of synchronization among ￿rms.
This can have important consequences for the ability of these models to pre-
dict the response of the economy to changes in the economic environment,
especially to changes in monetary policy. While one might expect that the
optimal pricing arrangements of ￿rms may respond to policy, they cannot in
the model. Since the duration of price stickiness and the degree of staggering
of pricing decisions in￿ uence the response of aggregate variables in the model
one may not end up with sensible predictions regarding how the economy will
respond to these changes.
Staggered price setting models were popular despite this well understood
weakness because staggering was viewed as a critical element, along with
long periods of price stickiness, in generating an inertial response of the price
level and aggregate output to monetary shocks. However recent work has
questioned the centrality of these two phenomena in propagating nominal
shocks. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) forcefully argue that staggering
1There are too many sticky price dynamic general equilibrium models to list here. Some
examples are King and Watson (1996), Yun (1996), Cho et al (1997), Chari et al. (2000),
Bergin and Feenstra (2000), Erceg et al. (2000) and Huang and Liu (2001).
2See Ascari (2004) for a reason to prefer Taylor style models in the presence of trend
in￿ ation.
3See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) for example.
2of pricing decisions is ine⁄ective in propagating output beyond the assumed
duration for which prices are ￿xed. In addition, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) show that price staggering is not crucial to generating realistic
impulse responses. Finally Bils and Klenow (2004) show that on average
prices change much more quickly in US data than has been assumed in the
sticky price literature.4
The goal of this paper is to show that it is not necessary to retain either
unappealing element in order to generate inertia not only in output but
also in the aggregate price level. To make this point forcefully, the paper
restricts the amount of exogenous price rigidity to one period, i.e., all ￿rms
set prices simultaneously at the beginning of each period. None the less, the
aggregate price level will adjust slowly to a money growth shock because all
￿rms optimally choose to adjust their prices slowly5. In the standard one-
period sticky price model, ￿rms wish to adjust prices in proportion with the
expected change in marginal costs next period. One way to slow down the
adjustment of prices is to introduce mechanisms that prevent marginal costs
from rising too fast. The other way is for ￿rms to actually choose to adjust
prices less than proportionally to expected marginal cost. In other words,
￿rms must change their markup. This paper incorporates both of the above
features.6 As a result the model can generate prices that adjust very slowly.
Since the ￿rm could in principle adjust fully to expected future in￿ ation after
the ￿rst period, any subsequent sluggishness seen in the impulse response of
prices is endogenous. Indeed, in the standard one period sticky price model,
almost all of the adjustment in a ￿rm￿ s price occurs in the ￿rst period after
the shock.
The paper uses two mechanisms that build upon each other to quan-
titatively generate realistic persistence in in￿ ation and output. The ￿rst
mechanism modi￿es the technological environment in which ￿rms operate by
introducing learning-by-doing.7 The second mechanism modi￿es consumers
4Bils and Klenow suggest that half of the prices studied lasted no more than 4.3 months
which is much shorter than the assumed duration of price rigidity (typically about 12
months) in the literature.
5This is not induced by imposing menu costs on the ￿rms.
6Some recent papers that try to generate price inertia by dampening the response of
marginal cost are Altig et al (2005), Neiss and Pappa (2005) and Danthine and Kurmann
(2004). Huang (2006) points out that some of these mechanisms may o⁄set each other
and impede the propagation of monetary shocks.
7See Arrow (1962) and especially Rosen (1972) for early discussions of learning-by-doing
as a by-product of production experience.
3preferences by introducing habit formation in leisure. I discuss them in turn.
Learning-by-doing in￿ uences price inertia in two ways by providing a
dynamic link between current production and future productivity. The basic
mechanism is quite intiutive. As ￿rms raise output to meet the increase in
demand that follows an expansion of the money supply, they accumulate
production knowledge which lowers future costs. In the periods after the
shock, when ￿rms are free to set prices, they face lower marginal costs and
thus set lower prices as compared to an environment without learning-by-
doing. In addition to this a more subtle mechanism may be in operation -
￿rms may actually choose to lower their markup over marginal cost. This
occurs because ￿rms face a trade-o⁄between increasing current revenue and
reducing future marginal costs. As a result, ￿rms use prices to control how
much they learn in any given period depending on the marginal value of
that learning to the ￿rm. To see this, consider a ￿rm that desires to reduce
future costs via learning-by-doing. To do this, it must increase output. Given
demand, in a monopolistically competitive environment, the ￿rm must lower
its price in order to sell this extra output.8 This has two implications for
the model. First, ￿rms will set lower prices compared to standard models
in which this dynamic trade-o⁄ is absent. In other words the steady state
markup charged by ￿rms is lower. Second, this markup will respond to shocks
that shift the demand for the ￿rm￿ s product, such as a money growth shock.
Consider an increase in the growth rate of money which leads to an in-
crease in the demand for a ￿rm￿ s product. This creates a favorable envi-
ronment for learning because the demand curve is more responsive to a cut
in price than in steady state. Essentially, a unit reduction in price yields
more learning bang for the buck by generating more production and greater
future cost reductions as compared to a similar price reduction in steady
state. If the marginal value of learning is high for a ￿rm, this mechanism
makes it want to lower the markup it charges over marginal cost relative
to steady state.9 When combined with the reductions in marginal cost in-
duced by learning-by-doing, the lower markups can be a potent mechanism
for generating price inertia.
Learning-by-doing also acts as a real propagation mechanism. The short
8I am abstracting from the possibility of inventories. Obviously a ￿rm could, for a
limited amount of time, produce output and store it rather than reduce price now. Given
storage costs, this output must eventually be sold, lowering prices at that time.
9The converse is also true. If the marginal value of learning is low (perhaps because of
high production in the recent past), the markup may be raised.
4lived increases in output generated by a standard sticky price model in re-
sponse to an unexpected increase in the growth rate of money are converted
into long lived increases due to the fact that productivity is above steady
state for a number of periods.
The other mechanism that contributes to the inertial response of the
model is the presence of habit formation in the utility function with regards
to the desire for leisure. Habits in leisure imply that consumers utiltity today
depends not only on the current level of leisure but also past levels. Due to
habit formation, high levels of leisure in the past lead to an increased desire
for leisure in the present, other things being constant. To see how this might
generate an inertial response in hours and output, consider the response of
hours in a sticky price model in the absence of habit formation. A one time
fall in the growth rate of money, leads to a reduced demand for output leading
to a sharp increase in leisure as ￿rms cut production in the impact period.
The next period, prices fall and money balances are restored almost to steady
state levels. As a result, output, hours and leisure revert to virtually steady
state levels. When consumers form habits, the desire for leisure rises as
re￿ ected in a rise in the marginal utility of leisure in the second period. As
a result, they are reluctant to return immediately to steady state levels of
leisure and accordingly hours stay below steady state for a number of periods.
This inertial response of hours also generates more ouput persistence which
in turn leads to in￿ ation persistence.
The e⁄ectiveness of these two mechanisms in generating quantitatively
realistic levels of inertia in output and the aggregate price level is evaluated
in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model with real money bal-
ances in preferences. Prices, in this model, are preset for one period only.
Simulations from a linearized version of the model, calibrated to the US econ-
omy, show that the model is capable of generating inertia in the aggregate
price level as well as in output that is close to that observed in the aggregate
US data. The ￿rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient of detrended output and
in￿ ation in US data is .93 and .82 respectively. The benchmark version of
the model with neither habits nor learning-by-doing generates .013 and .015
respectively. The full model with both mechanisms built in delivers .71 and
.81 respectively.
As far as I am aware there are no previous studies of closed economy
business cycles that incorporate learning-by-doing into monetary dynamic
5general equilibrium models.10 However, Cooper and Johri (2002), show that
learning-by-doing is extremely e⁄ective at propagating technology shocks in
a real business cycle framework. Cooper and Johri use a representative agent
framework and are agnostic about the issue of who actually learns from past
production: workers or ￿rms, and thus o⁄er no account of possible decen-
tralizations. In complementary work, Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002)
focus solely on learning that is embodied in workers and is fully captured in
wages. They estimate the aggregate learning rate for the US using data from
the PSID and incorporate this into a dynamic general equilibrium model with
real shocks. They too are able to generate a persistent response of output to
real shocks.
There is similarly little work on habit formation in leisure in the context
of dynamic general equilibrium models with money shocks. An example is
Yun (1996). Bouakez and Kano (2006) and Wen (1998) use habit formation
in leisure in the context of a real business cycle model. Unlike Yun, in both
papers, the stock of habit is formed based on a long lived distributed lag over
past levels of leisure (or hours).
The next section presents the model and discusses the two mechanisms in
more detail. Section 3 discusses the calibration of key parameters, section 4
presents some analytical and simulation results. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes a monetary economy populated by many identical,
in￿nitely lived consumers. Each period, the economy ￿nds itself in one of
￿nitely many states, st: Let st = (s0
;:::;st) be the history of these states of
the world. Along with labour and a good that is used both for consumption
and investment, the commodities in the economy are money, a continuum of
intermediate goods, and organizational capital.
There are a large number of ￿nal good producers who behave compet-
itively and use the following technology for converting intermediate goods
10The closest models, Tsuruga (2007) and Cook(1999), incorporate dynamic production
externalities to propagate monetary shocks. Cooper and Johri (1997) discuss how these
externalities may be interpreted as learning e⁄ects. Unlike the current model, these dy-
namic externalities do not generate endogenous markup movements. While potentially
very important, externalities are ignored in this paper to focus on the impact of internal
learning-by-doing on pricing decisions.










Each period they choose inputs Yi(st) for all i 2 [0;1]; and output Y (st)








subject to (1) where P(st) denotes the price of the ￿nal good at history
st;while Pi(st￿1) is the price paid for the ith intermediate good in period t.
Note that these prices are set before the realization of the period t shock.











The zero pro￿t condition can be used to infer the level of ￿nal goods











There are a large number of intermediate goods producers, indexed by the
letter i who operate in a Dixit-Stiglitz style imperfectly competitive economy.
Each of these produces intermediate goods with a technology given by F(.)







Here Ni(st) is the amount of labor hired, Ki(st) is the amount of physical
capital hired by the ￿rm to produce output, Yi(st); and A(st) is a com-
mon term governing the level of total factor productivity. In addition to
these conventional inputs, the ￿rm carries a stock of organizational capital,
Hi(st￿1); which is an input in the production technology. Organizational
capital refers to the information accumulated by the ￿rm in the process of
past production regarding how best to organize its production activities and
deploy its inputs.11 As a result, the higher the level of organizational capital,
11Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) model and estimate the size of organizational capital for
the US manufacturing sector and ￿nd that it has a value of roughly 66 percent of physical
capital.
7the more productive the ￿rm. Learning-by-doing leads to the accumulation










All producers begin life with a positive and identical endowment of organi-
zational capital. I assume 0 < ￿ < 1and 0 < ￿ ￿ 1:
While learning-by-doing is often associated with workers and modeled as
the accumulation of human capital, a number of economists have argued that
￿rms are also store-houses of knowledge. Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) note ￿At
least as far back as Marshall (1930, bk.iv, chap. 13.I), economists have argued
that organizations store and accumulate knowledge that a⁄ects their tech-
nology of production. This accumulated knowledge is a type of unmeasured
capital distinct from the concepts of physical or human capital in the stan-
dard growth model." Similarly Lev & Radharkrishnan (2003) write, ￿Orga-
nization capital is thus an agglomeration of technologies￿ business practices,
processes and designs, including incentive and compensation systems￿ that
enable some ￿rms to consistently extract out of a given level of resources
a higher level of product and at lower cost than other ￿rms." There are at
least two ways to think about what constitutes organizational capital. Some,
like Rosen (1972), think of it as a ￿rm speci￿c capital good while others
focus on speci￿c knowledge embodied in the matches between workers and
tasks within the ￿rm. While these di⁄erences are important, especially when
trying to measure the payments associated with various inputs, they are not
crucial to the issues at hand. As a result I do not distinguish between the
two.
This speci￿cation of how learning-by-doing leads to productivity increases
draws on early work by Arrow(1962) and Rosen(1972) as well as a large em-
pirical literature dating back roughly a hundred years which documents the
pervasive presence of learning e⁄ects in virtually every area of the economy.
Recent studies include Bahk & Gort (1993), Irwin & Klenow (1994), Jarmin
(1994), Benkard (2000), Thompson (2001), Thornton & Thompson (2001)
and Cooper & Johri (2002). The current speci￿cation is taken from Cooper
and Johri (2002) which not only o⁄ers a detailed justi￿cation for the mod-
elling assumptions but also a number of estimates of the learning technology
at di⁄erent levels of aggregation for the US economy.
The crucial di⁄erence between the traditional speci￿cation of learning-
8by-doing and this one is that it allows for curvature in the accumulation of
knowledge. The traditional speci￿cation assumes that organizational capital
at time t equals the cumulative sum of all output ever produced by the ￿rm.
Thus it may be written as




whereas the speci￿cation used in Cooper and Johri may be written in logs as





This modi￿cation of the traditional speci￿cation of learning has a number
of advantages. First, it allows for the sensible idea that production knowledge
may become less and less relevant over time as new techniques of production,
new product lines and new markets emerge. Second, it allows in a general
way for the idea that some match speci￿c knowledge may be lost to the ￿rm
as workers leave or get reassigned to new tasks or teams within the ￿rm. In
addition, the knowledge accumulated through production experience will be
a function of the current vintage of physical capital. The decision to replace
physical capital will imply that the existing stock of organizational capital
will be less relevant. Third, it allows for the existence of a steady state
in which the stock of organizational capital is constant. In contrast, the
traditional speci￿cation in the empirical learning-by-doing literature allows
the stock of organizational capital to grow unboundedly. An alternative way
to bound learning is to assume that productivity increases due to learning
occur for a ￿xed number of periods. While this may be appropriate for any
one task or worker within the ￿rm, we think of the internal context of ￿rms as
an environment with an ever changing set of tasks, workers, teams, machines
and information. In this context it may be better to model organizational
capital as continually accumulating and depreciating.
The restriction ￿ < 1 is consistent with the empirical evidence supporting
the hypothesis of depreciation of organizational capital often referred to as
organizational forgetting. Argote et al. (1990) provide empirical evidence for
this hypothesis of organizational forgetting associated with the construction
of Liberty Ships during World War II. Similarly, Darr et al. (1995) provide
evidence for this hypothesis for pizza franchises and Benkard (2000) provides
9evidence for organizational forgetting associated with the production of com-
mercial aircraft. One di⁄erence between these studies and this paper is that
the accumulation technology is log-linear rather than linear. Clarke (2006)
shows that the additional curvature in this log-linear technology is unlikely
to produce predictions for aggregate variables, in response to a technology
shock, considerably di⁄erent to those associated with a linear technology. It
is the implied dynamic structure associated with the accumulation of orga-
nizational capital, rather than any functional form assumptions that drives
the results in Cooper and Johri (2002). Similar results should follow in the
current context.
Each intermediate goods producer faces a downward sloping demand func-
tion for his product (3) which comes from the pro￿t maximization problem
of the ￿nal goods producers discussed above. Prices are set by all producers
at the beginning of each period before the realization of the event st and
cannot be changed during the period once set. Thus there are two di⁄er-
ences between the intermediate goods ￿rm￿ s problem in the typical staggered
price-setting model and this paper. First, the technology has been modi￿ed
to incorporate learning-by-doing. Second, ￿rms set prices for one period in a
synchronized way which is a special case of an N period overlapping contracts
structure with N=1.
At the beginning period t, each producer chooses a price Pi(st￿1) before
the shocks are realized and the level of organizational capital, Hi(st); after













subject to (3) and (6) where Q(st j st￿1) is the appropriate discount rate
to use to price revenue and costs in adjoining periods which is determined
in the household problem. V (st) denotes the real cost function which has
the real wage,w(st);the real rental rate on capital, r(st);Hi(st￿1) and Yi(st)














t)) ￿ Y : (10)












t)) = Y (12)
from which the input demands can be obtained. Substituting these into (9)
yields the cost function: Taking Vi(st) as given, the solution to the maximiza-
















































] = 0 (14)
where ￿
F(st) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the organizational
capital accumulation equation once (3) has been used to substitute out for
Yi(st): The latter ￿rst order condition determines the optimal level of prices
to be set by the producer. Note that the state has been suppressed in this
equation except where it is needed to avoid confusion. Raising prices by one
unit causes output to fall since producers face downward sloping demand
curves for their product. The ￿rst term captures the net impact on current
revenue of the higher price but lower output, while the second term repre-
sents the current cost savings from producing less. The third term appears
because the producer realizes that he faces a forward looking problem due
to learning by doing. The accumulation equation for organizational capital
implies that a reduction of current period output will lead to a reduction in
organizational capital available tomorrow. The third term captures the value
11of this organizational capital lost to the ￿rm and is made up of three parts.
The term ( 1
1￿￿)
Yit
Pit represents the reduction in output due to the higher price,
while ￿0
Y(Hit;Yit) represents the reduction in Hit+1due to the reduction in
output which must be evaluated at ￿
F
t ; the marginal value of organizational
capital to the ￿rm.
Equation (13) determines the value of having available an additional unit
of organizational capital for use by the ￿rm in the following period. First,
the additional organizational capital improves pro￿ts by reducing costs, as
captured by the second term on the right hand side (recall V 0
Hit+1 is negative).
Second, it adds to the ability of the organization to learn from production
thus raising future organizational capital. This additional organizational
capital has a value of ￿
F
t+1 for the ￿rm. All this must be discounted by the
price of one dollar in period t+1 in units of period t dollars. Alternatively
one could say that the ￿rm sets prices so that the value of accumulating an
additional unit of organizational capital today is just equal to the discounted
value of organizational capital tomorrow.
The intuition in (13) and (14) suggests that ￿rms face a trade-o⁄between
current pro￿ts and future pro￿ts which is not present in the traditional price
setting problem. Charging a higher price today lowers the amount of or-
ganizational capital available tomorrow which raises future costs and lowers
future pro￿ts. As a result, ￿rms will optimally select a lower price in the
presence of learning by doing than they would otherwise set. This can be













and noting that the second term appears only when the learning-by-doing
mechanism is present.
Note that each intermediate good ￿rm earns positive pro￿ts even in the
presence of a constant returns to scale technology due to the accumulation
of organizational capital. However there is no entry or exit in this industry
by assumption.
2.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by a large number of identical consumers whose
preferences are de￿ned over consumption of ￿nal goods (C(st)), leisure (L(st))
12and real money balances (M(st)=P(st)). The preference speci￿cation below
allows for endogenous habit formation with b ￿ 0 being the parameter which
determines the degree of habit persistence. These preferences reduce to
the standard speci￿cation with no habits for b = 0. Each consumer maxi-
mizes the sum of discounted expected utility subject to a sequence of budget
constraints (given below) by choosing the optimal quantity of these goods
to consume, the amount of hours to work and how much to invest x(st)in
physical capital (K(st)) and one-period nominal bonds B(st+1) each period.
They take as given prices (P(st)), wages (w(st) ) and interest rates (r(st)
















































t) ￿ 1: (18)
Consumers lend out their stock of physical capital and labor services to
intermediate goods producers and receive wages and interest income. Each
of the nominal bonds, B(st+1); provides one dollar in state st+1at the expense
of Q(st+1 j st) dollars in state st. In addition they receive ￿(st); the current
pro￿ts of intermediate goods producers as owners of all ￿rms and T(st) the
current real net transfers from the monetary authority. The initial conditions
K(s￿1);M(s￿1);B(s0) are also given. Consumers face quadratic costs of
adjusting the capital stock. In particular, the capital stock evolves according
to
K(s















While these adjustment costs are a real resource cost for the economy, since
investment equals depreciation in steady state, no adjustment costs are in-
curred in steady state.
13In addition to the above constraints, we need the sequence of borrowing
constraints B(st+1) ￿ Bu for some large negative value of Bu:






















































where Uj(si) denotes the derivative of U with respect to variable j evaluated





















The interpretation of these ￿rst order conditions is quite standard. Equa-
tion (20) gives the optimal labor-leisure choice. The presence of habits adds
a second term on the right hand side and introduces dynamics into the deci-
sion. An extra unit of leisure today generates not only some positive current
marginal utility but it also raises the desire for leisure tomorrow by increas-
ing the marginal utility of leisure tomorrow. (21) is the optimality condition
determining money demand. It states that the consumer should choose to
save nominal balances to the point that the current net bene￿t of saving an
additional dollar (which is made up of the marginal utility lost due to lower
current consumption minus the marginal utility gained due to higher money
balances) is just equal to the discounted expected bene￿t next period( com-
posed of the marginal utility of the extra consumption that can be bought
next period which in turn depends on the expected value of in￿ ation over
this interval). Equation (22) is the equation which determines optimal bond
holdings while equation (23) is the optimality condition for capital accumula-
tion. This condition looks slightly di⁄erent from the standard intertemporal
euler equation due to the presence of adjustment costs. Since v ￿ 0, at the
14optimum, the household endogeneizes the fact that one unit of foregone con-





units of capital tomorrow.
Also, note that ￿(st+1jst) = ￿(st+1)=￿(st) is the probability of state st+1
conditional on state st having been realized.





where ￿(st) is a stochastic process. Consumers receive lump sum transfers






In addition to these ￿rst order conditions from the consumer and ￿rm
problem we have market clearing conditions which require that the total
stock of capital supplied by consumers is equal to the sum of capital rented
by all intermediate goods ￿rms. Similarly the total hours of labor supplied by
consumers should equal the sum of labor hours demanded by all intermediate
goods ￿rms. Recall that while prices are chosen by ￿rms before uncertainty
about shocks is resolved, factor demands are chosen afterwards. Bond market




t) = Y (s
t): (26)
An equilibrium is a collection of allocations for consumers, C(st);N(st);
x(st), B(st+1) and M(st); allocations for intermediate goods ￿rms: Ni(st);
Ki(st);Hi(st￿1) for all i 2 [0;1]; allocations for ￿nal goods ￿rms: Y (st);Y d
i (st)
for all i 2 [0;1]; together with prices w(st);r(st);Q(st+1 j st);P(st);Pi(st￿1);
for all i 2 [0;1] that satisfy the following conditions: i) taking prices as
given the consumer allocations solve the consumer￿ s problem; ii)taking all
prices but its own as given, each intermediate goods producer￿ s price and
stock of organizational capital satis￿es (12) and (13); iii) taking prices as
given the ￿nal goods producers allocations solve the ￿nal goods producer
problem; iv) the factor market conditions and resource constraint hold and
the bond market clears. Only symmetric equilibria in which all consumers
and producers behave identically are studied.
153 Computation method and calibration
The model is solved using the method outlined in King and Watson (2002) us-
ing a linear approximation to the system of equations including the ￿rst order
conditions of the intermediate goods producers problem, the ￿rst order con-
ditions from the consumers problem, the production function, the resource
constraint for the economy and the accumulation equation for physical and
organizational capital. Some variables are growing in steady state - they are
rendered stationary by dividing by the stock of money in the economy.
In order to simulate the economy, functional forms have to be speci￿ed.
With the exception of the presence of habit formation in leisure, the speci￿-














t = Lt￿bLt￿1 and b governs the extent to which habits are formed.
A number of estimates of b are available in the literature ranging from a high
of roughly 0:8 in Eichenbaum, Hansen and Singleton (1988) to a low around
0:5 in Braun and Evans (1998). For the baseline calibration, I picked the
midpoint value of b=.65. Sensitivity analysis with b=.5 is also provided.
Other parameters related to preferences are taken from Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2000). I set ! = :94; and ￿ = :39 and set   so that the fraction
of the time endowment spent on working in steady state is :3. The typical
value for ￿; in the literature is unity. However, non-separability in leisure
contributes to generating in￿ ation inertia. In order to stay close to unity and
yet allow for non-separability I set ￿ = 1:1: This value of sigma was used
for all models with habits in leisure including the speci￿cation refered to in
the tables and ￿gures as the full model. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of
in￿ ation, ￿￿; in the full model (but not output) is senstive to small changes
in ￿: As ￿ goes from 1 to 1.1, ￿￿ goes from about .6 to .8. This sensitivity
to ￿ is much less acute in the absence of habits. Nonetheless higher values
of ￿ deliver bigger ￿￿ as well as less investment volatility. If ￿ is too high
it is impossible to generate enough volatility in investment even without
adjustment costs. Therefore for the benchmark model without learning or
habits, ￿ is chosen so that the model is able to deliver the correct relative
volatility of investment . This value (￿ = 4) is kept constant in all other
cases without habits. In all cases, the investment adjustment cost parameter,
v; is set to keep the ratio of the standard deviation of investment and output
16equal to their value in the US data.
Following Cooper and Johri (2002), ￿; the discount factor is set to :984
while ￿; the depreciation rate is set to :02, the value estimated in Johri and
Letendre (2007). The parameter ￿ is chosen in all models to maintain a
steady state markup of 5%.
Turning to the speci￿cation of technology, intermediate goods producers






















The elasticity of output w.r.t. physical capital is set to .39 to deliver a
capital output ratio of 10.24 and ￿ is chosen to maintain constant returns in
the benchmark model without learning-by-doing.
Turning to the parameters associated with learning-by-doing, I set the
elasticity of output with respect to organizational capital, " = 0:16 in the
speci￿cation referred to as full model. This value corresponds to a "learning
rate" of just under twelve percent and is taken from 4-digit level production
function estimates for US manufacturing industries provided in Cooper and
Johri.12 This is approximately the same value used by Atkeson and Kehoe
(2005) in their study on organizational capital. Sensitivity analysis is con-
ducted with a ￿fteen percent learning rule. Note that these learning rates
are much lower than commonly estimated in microeconomic studies in the
traditional learning-by-doing literature. The "consensus" estimate based on
an extensive list of industries over the past hundred or so years appears to
be twenty percent learning. See Irwin and Klenow (1994) for estimates in
the semi-conductor industry as well as a discussion of past studies. Note
that these studies impose quite strong restrictions on the accumulation of
organizational capital which is governed by
H(t + 1) = H(t) + Y (t):
In particular, note that each unit of past output contributes equally (a value
of unity) to the accumulation of H(t+1) through H(t) no matter how long ago
12See row 1 of table 2 on page 1552.
17it was produced. To the extent that knowledge gleaned from past produc-
tion is either lost to the ￿rm because of labour turnover or re-organizations
or becomes increasingly irrelevant over time, imposing a value of unity on
the contribution of H(t) seems overly restrictive. Both Benkard (2000) and
Cooper and Johri (2002) drop this restriction. Benkard shows that allowing
for ￿organizational forgetting￿leads to higher estimates of the learning rate.
For example in his work on aircraft production, the estimated learning rate
rises from roughly 20 percent to 39 percent once "organizational forgetting"
is allowed. Keeping this in mind, and the even higher estimate of " = .49 for
the aggregate economy in Cooper-Johri (2002), suggests that the amount of
learning-by-doing built into the model is fairly conservative.
I set ￿ = :55 and ￿ = 1 which are the values that correspond to " = :16; in
the estimates reported by Cooper and Johri. The persistence in the growth
rate of money was set to .57, taken from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000).
4 Results
4.1 Some Analytical Results
In this section, we present some analytical results regarding the dynamics of
prices implied by the learning e⁄ects introduced in this paper and compare
them to some well known models in the sticky price literature. As is usual, I
make some simpli￿cations in order to solve the model analytically. I assume
that there is no physical capital in the economy and impose a static money
demand equation instead of (21): Habit formation in leisure is also ignored.
The key equation that governs the dynamics of prices emerges from the















subject to (3) and (29). For our purposes, it is useful to substitute the
input demand function (3) in (29) and derive an expression for Pi; the input














18Note that the joint implication of a downward sloping demand curve and
the accumulation equation for organizational capital is that prices are de-
creasing in H(st) and increasing in P(st);Y (st) and H(st￿1). While I have
discussed the reasons why prices must be reduced in order to speed up the
accumulation of organizational capital, it is worth explaining why prices are
increasing in H(st￿1); the current level of organizational capital. The ac-
cumulation technology (29) implies that additional units of organizational
capital today increase the ability of the ￿rm to learn, leading to more organi-
zational capital tomorrow. As a result of this improved e¢ ciency in learning,
less needs to be produced today in order to achieve any target level of orga-
nizational capital tomorrow. Given downward sloping demand curves facing
￿rms, this implies that prices can be higher.









Replacing (31) and (32) in (30) and maximizing over H(st) yields an e¢ -
ciency condition for the ith intermediate goods ￿rm which is the equivalent
of combining (13) and (14): our dynamic pricing equation. Rearranging





















































Using symmetry in equilibrium gives us : Yi(st) = Y (st);Hi(st) = H(st)
and Pi(st) = P(st) for all states. Linearizing (33) around the deterministic
steady state, and assuming that ￿ = ￿ = 1 and using (22) to substitute out
Q we get:
b Pt = R1E( b wt ￿ ￿c Ht) ￿ R1(￿￿ + ￿)E(b Pt + d wt+1 ￿ ￿ d Ht+1 + b Yt)
+(￿ ￿ 1)E b Yt + (R1 + ￿)E b Pt (34)
where R1 =
￿￿1
(￿+￿￿)￿1 is only a function of the three key learning-by-
doing parameters. Here b wt; c Ht; b Pt;and b Yt; represent percent deviations from
19steady state for w(st);H(st￿1);P(st) and Y (st) respectively and E refers
to the expectation at t ￿ 1. It is useful to compare this expression to the
corresponding expression when no learning e⁄ects are present:
c Pit = E(b Pt + b wt): (35)
which tells us that ￿rms would change prices by the expected change in
nominal wage rate.
The static money demand equation implies that c Mt ￿ b Pt = b Ct = b Yt .
Given the preferences in (27), we can use (20) and market clearing conditions
to obtain the following expression:
b wt = (1 + ￿)b Yt ￿ ￿￿c Ht: (36)
where ￿ = (N=1￿N)%. In this expression, N denotes steady state hours
and % is the elasticity of the marginal utility of leisure w.r.t. leisure. Note
that in the absence of learning-by-doing, the expression would reduce to
b wt = (1+￿)b Yt as in Chari et al (2000). Linearizing (29) gives us the following
expression




where L is the lag operator. (37) can then be used to replace c Ht and d Ht+1
while b wt can be replaced using (36) in (34). Now ￿rst simplify the resulting
expression by noting that R1(1 ￿ (￿￿ + ￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ , and then multiplying
through by 1 ￿ ￿L; and applying the lag operator as appropriate we get
our expression for output and ￿nally replacing b Yt with c Mt ￿ b Pt we get the
expression for prices:
d1E d Pt+1 ￿ d2E b Pt + d3 d Pt￿1 = d1E d Mt+1 ￿ d2Ec Mt + d3 d Mt￿1 (38)
where d1 = (1 + ￿)(￿￿ + ￿) + ￿];d2 = [(1 + ￿)(￿￿ + ￿)2 + ￿] and d3 =
￿￿ + (1 + ￿)(￿￿):
Comparing this expression to the equivalent expression for a two-period
staggered price setting problem without learning-by-doing (taken from Chari
et al in 39 below) reveals that the two equations have a similar second or-
der di⁄erence equation structure. Apart from key di⁄erences in coe¢ cients,
which I discuss below, note also that learning-by-doing involves not only a
20lead in the exogenous money process but also a lag which is missing in the
absence of learning e⁄ects.
E d Pt+1 ￿ 2
2 + ￿
￿￿
b Pt + d Pt￿1 = ￿2
1 + ￿
￿￿
E( d Mt+1 + Ec Mt) (39)
For our preferences it is easy to check that ￿ is decreasing in ￿ and in  :
Chari et al show that the dynamics of their system is controlled by ￿: ￿ also
plays an important role here. While the absolute magnitude of d1;d2;and d3
are all increasing in ￿; for our parameterizations these are negative numbers.
As a result all three are decreasing in ￿: The dynamics of the system depends
on ￿1; the stable root of the characteristic quadratic associated with (38)
where ￿1 +￿2 =
d2
d1 and ￿1:￿2 =
d3
d1. Given the values of other parameters, it
is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿: The stable root, ￿1; also depends on the
learning by doing parameters. While it is increasing in all three parameters:
￿; ￿ and ￿;note that it is relatively more sensitive to small changes in ￿ than
the other two parameters. The degree of sensitivity is increasing in ￿: Figure
1 plots the sensitivity of ￿1 to these parameters.
The results of this section suggest that learning-by-doing plays an impor-
tant role in increasing the inertia of the price level. Equation (38) suggests
that one-period price-setting behaviour by ￿rms mimics a two-period stag-
gered price setting environment as in Taylor (1980) with some additional
dynamics coming from the lagged money shock term. From a quantitative
perspective though, the key to matching the degree of inertia seen in the
data, is the value of ￿1: Chari et al. argue that structural restrictions placed
on ￿; prevent their model from generating much inertia in either in￿ ation
or aggregate output. In Chari et al., ￿1 must be negative whereas, like
Taylor (who treated it as a free parameter), values of ￿1 calculated in the
learning-by-doing model are positive and lie between zero and unity. From
the perspective of this argument, learning-by-doing succeeds in generating
realistic levels of inertia because the additional learning parameters break
the tight link between ￿1 and ￿ seen in Chari et al. While, the results of
this section are instructive, they are based on unrealistic restrictions which
I drop in the next section.
4.2 Dynamics in the full model
The main question addressed in this section is how much additional inertia in
the aggregate price level is generated by adding learning-by-doing and habits
21in leisure to the benchmark one period sticky price model when the economy
is hit by money growth shocks. I also discuss how these mechanisms in￿ uence
the persistence of aggregate output movements. I begin with a discussion of
the auto-correlation between in￿ ation and its ￿rst lag (￿￿) as well as output
and its ￿rst lag (￿y). I then discuss the model generated impulse response of
key variables to a one percent increase in the growth rate of money.13
Table 1 reports the ￿rst order auto-correlation coe¢ cients of in￿ ation and
output for various models. Row 1 of the table corresponds to the benchmark
model. In the absence of learning-by-doing and habits the one-period sticky
price model delivers negligible persistence in in￿ ation and output. The actual
values are ￿￿ = :015 and ￿y = :013: Row 2 reports corresponding moments for
the full model. Both mechanisms are operational in this speci￿cation which
has a learning rate of 12 percent and a moderate level of habit formation
(b = :65). There is a dramatic increase in in￿ ation inertia and persistence
in aggregate output relative to row 1. The corresponding auto-correlation
coe¢ cients rise to ￿￿ = :808 and ￿y = :707: This compares favourably to
the actual moments for US data reported in row 7 which are ￿￿ = :82 and
￿y = :93 respectively.
Rows 3-6 attempt to disentangle the contribution of the two mechanisms
and provide some sensitivity analysis. Rows 3 and 4 investigate models
with only learning e⁄ects but no habits while rows 5 and 6 vary the habits
parameter, b; in the absence of learning-by-doing. Rows 3 and 4 show that
learning-by-doing can account for a signi￿cant proportion of in￿ ation and
output inertia ranging from roughly one-third with 12 percent learning rates
to roughly one-half with 15 percent learning rates. Rows 5 and 6 show that
on its own, habit formation does better at accounting for in￿ ation inertia
and roughly as well at accounting for output persistence.
Figure 2 compares the impulse response of in￿ ation between the full model
and the benchmark sticky price model. Both models recieve a persistent but
unexpected one percent increase in the growth rate of money. Since ￿rms
cannot respond to a money shock surprise within the period, in￿ ation is
unchanged in the period of the shock. In the absence of learning or habits,
￿rms raise prices by just over 2 percent in the period after the shock. The
response of prices is much more muted in the full model, rising by roughly
.3 percent in period 2. The contrast between the two models is also stark in
period 3. While in the benchmark model, in￿ ation is almost back to steady
13The model responses to a fall in the growth rate of money are symmetric.
22state levels, it rises to .65 percent in the full model and then slowly retreats
back to steady state in the periods after.
The full model generates considerably more in￿ ation inertia for two rea-
sons. First, due to the presence of learning-by-doing and habit formation,
marginal costs rise very slowly. Second, ￿rms may wish to take advantage
of the high demand for their product to learn, and therefore raise prices by
less than the increase in marginal cost. In other words, ￿rms may lower their
markups. These two e⁄ects can be seen in Figures 3a and 3b. Figure 3a
plots the response of nominal marginal cost in the benchmark and full model
in the periods after the shock occurs. These variables are normalized by the
money supply so that if costs were to rise in proportion to the money supply,
the response would be zero. The behaviour of costs in the two models is quite
di⁄erent. In the benchmark model, nominal costs increase faster than money
supply while in the full model, nominal costs increase slower than the money
supply. Figure 3b plots the additional in￿ uence on price inertia exerted by
time-varying markups. We see that ￿rms lower their markup below steady
state levels in the periods immediately after the shock occurs. As organi-
zational capital is accumulated, it￿ s marginal value falls so that after three
periods ￿rms ￿nd it more pro￿table to raise markups slightly. A glance at
Figures 3a and 3b sugest that the impact of marginal costs on price inertia
is larger than that of declining markups.
Figure 4 reports the response of output, consumption, investment and
hours for the benchmark and full models. In the absence of the two prop-
agation mechanisms, all four variables jump up in the impact period and
thereafter fall back to essentially steady state levels. The presence of learning-
by-doing and habit formation lead to much longer drawn out responses as
expected. Hours are above steady state for fourteen quarters while output
is above steady state for over thirty quarters. Since the capital stock is pre-
determined and prices cannot be changed, ￿rms must meet the increase in
demand for their products by hiring more labour. Consumers respond to the
increase in income by consuming and investing more. Since prices are ￿xed
in the impact period, the impulse responses are similar in the two models
with slightly bigger spikes in the full model. Once prices can respond to
the increase in money, ￿rms sharply increase their prices in period 2 in the
benchmark model but much less so in the full model. This causes a sharp fall
in real money balances in the benchmark model and therefore in the demand
for intermediate and ￿nal goods. As a result, in the quarter after the shock,
output, hours and investment are virtually back to their steady state levels.
23Due to a slight increase in the capital stock, output is slightly above steady
state levels and hours are a touch below steady state levels. Since the rise
in prices is muted in the full model, the fall in real variables is also muted
and elongated. The presence of learning by doing also implies that the ini-
tial spike in production leads to the accumulation of organizational capital
which raises ￿rm-level productivity in period 2. This directly leads to more
production. Moreover, the higher productivity means that each ￿rm￿ s labour
demand curve shifts outwards leading to more labour being hired in period
2 than in the benchmark model. This e⁄ect is strengthened by the habit
formation process. The initial spike in hours worked leads to a fall in the
marginal utility of leisure in period 2 for any level of period 2 hours. This
means consumers are more willing to work at any given wage rate.
What justi￿es the higher production by ￿rms in the periods subsequent
to the shock in the full model? Recall that in the presence of learning e⁄ects,
￿rms choose not to increase prices by the full increase in money. As a result,
real money balances with consumers remain above steady state levels for long
periods of time and consequently demand for ￿nal and intermediate goods
remains high.
4.3 Business cycle moments
In this section I brie￿ y ask if the improvements in the ability of the full model
to generate price inertia come at the expense of performance on other fronts.
Some evidence that this is not the case emerges from the impulse response
analysis above. Further evidence can be gleaned by looking at a standard
set of business cycle moments for the benchmark and full model relative to
aggregate US data.14
Table 2 reports un￿ltered theoretical second moments for the benchmark
and full model in rows 1 and 2 respectively. The corresponding moments
for log-linearly detrended US data (taken from Cooper and Johri (2002))
are reported in the last row. In all cases the money shock has a standard
deviation of .00498 which is the value used in Nelson (1998). Looking across
the rows of table 3, all the models do a good job of capturing the basic features
of business cycles. Consumption, hours and investment are all procyclical and
there is evidence of consumption smoothing. The two models also inherit
14These moments emerge from an environment with only money growth shocks. Mo-
ments with both money and technology shocks are available from the author.
24some common problems: in all cases consumption is more volatile than in
the US data and too highly correlated with output. In fact the behaviour of
consumption is virtually identical in the two models. Similarly, investment
is too highly correlated with output in both models relative to the data. The
￿rst clear di⁄erences across models appear when we study the behaviour of
hours. The benchmark model generates too much relative volatility compared
to the data. The full model in row 2 lowers the relative volatility of hours
from 1.66 to 1.34 which is still too high relative to US data. It also lowers
the correlation between hours and output bringing it closer to the data.
5 Conclusions
Learning-by-doing and habit formation in leisure is introduced into a mone-
tary dynamic general equilibrium model. In order to highlight the ability of
the model to generate inertia in the aggregate price level, all other sources of
inertia commonly used in the literature such as menu costs, staggered price
or wage contracts are ignored. The model therefore relies on the minimal
amount of price stickiness needed: prices are chosen before the shocks occur.
A calibrated version of the model generates considerable inertia in both in￿ a-
tion and output dynamics in response to money growth shocks. The model
also does reasonably well in matching moments that capture key features of
the US business cycle.
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29￿￿; ￿y
Benchmark model: no lbd, no habits .015 .013
Full model: 12% learning, b = :65 .808 .707
12 % learning, no habits .31 .335
15 % learning, no habits .459 .466
no lbd, moderate habits b = :65 .714 .511
no lbd, low habits, b = :5 .455 .342
US data .8207 .9343
Table 1: Price-level inertia





Benchmark: no lbd, no habits 0.92 1.30 1.64 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01
Full model 0.93 1.30 1.33 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.71
US Data 0.69 1.30 0.52 0.89 0.60 0.71 0.93
Table 2: Second Moments
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